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Governmental Tort Liability Immunity
Anthony Masino and Elizabeth McCurry
The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of
2009 (hereinafter “the
Recovery Act”) has its
proponents and detractors.
At a time when the United
States was facing its worst
recession in more than fifty
years, the 111th session of
the United States Congress
(“Congress”) passed the
Recovery Act to stimulate
and stabilize the United
States economy. The
intention of the Recovery Act
was to create jobs, promote
additional capital
investment, increase
consumer spending, and
minimize or avoid
reductions in state and local
government services. In
total, more than $700
billion was allocated to the
Recovery Act via federal tax
cuts, expansion of
unemployment benefits and
domestic spending for
education, health care, and
infrastructure. More than a
third of the money was
slated for projects and
activities, including
construction and certain
research projects. To
implement a project using
the allocated federal funds,
agencies and funding
recipients must comply with
federal laws and
regulations.1 This article will
address whether
governmental immunity to
tort liability has been
imputed to infrastructure
projects funded via the
Recovery Act. This article
will summarize the Recovery
Act and the background and
history of governmental tort
immunity while addressing
the possibility that
immunity at the federal and
state levels has been
imputed to government
contractors based upon the
Recovery Act. While this
article highlights the
potential implications, final
determination is beyond its
scope and may not be fully
resolved until federal
and/or state courts address
the matter directly.
The Recovery Act
The Recovery Act
received bipartisan support
during the transition from
one administration to the
next. The newly elected
President stated the
Recovery Act
will create or save
3.5 million jobs over
the next two years.
It’s that we’re
putting Americans to
work doing the work
that America needs
done, in critical
areas that have been
neglected for too
long; work that will
bring real and
lasting change for
generations to come.
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Because we know we
can’t build our
economic future on
the transportation
and information
networks of the past,
we are remaking the
American landscape
with the largest new
investment in our
nation’s infra-
structure since
Eisenhower built an
Interstate Highway
System in the 1950s.
Because of this
investment, nearly
400,000 men and
women will go to
work rebuilding our
crumbling roads and
bridges, repairing
our faulty dams and
levees, bringing
critical broadband
connections to
businesses and
homes in nearly
every community in
America, upgrading
mass transit,
building high-speed
rail lines that will
improve travel and
commerce
throughout our
nation.2
The Recovery Act was a
direct response to the
economic crisis, with three
immediate goals:
• Create new jobs and save
existing ones;
• Spur economic activity
and invest in long-term
growth; and
• Foster unprecedented
levels of accountability
and transparency in
government spending.
The Recovery Act intends to
achieve those goals by
• Providing $288 billion in
tax cuts and benefits for
millions of working
families and businesses; 
• Increasing federal funds
for education and health
care as well as
entitlement programs
(such as extending
unemployment benefits)
by $224 billion; 
• Making $275 billion
available for federal
contracts (over $100
billion for infrastructure
projects), grants and
loans; and
• Requiring recipients of
Recovery funds to report
quarterly on how they are
using the money.
More than $100 billion is
targeted for infrastructure
development and enhance-
ment. Of the $100 billion,
more than $48 billion is
slated for transportation
infrastructure improve-
ments including more than
$27 billion for highway and
bridge construction, $8
billion for intercity
passenger rail projects, $2
billion for commercial rail
infrastructure, $750 million
for public transportation
system maintenance, $200
million for upgrades to air
traffic control centers,
facilities and equipment as
well as $100 million for
shipyard improvements.
Another $18 billion is
earmarked for water,
sewage, environment, and
public lands infrastructure
including more than $4
billion for environmental
restoration, flood protection,
hydropower, and navigation
infrastructure projects and
$4 billion for wastewater
treatment facility
infrastructure
improvements. Further-
more, more than $7 billion
is designated for
government building and
facility improvements.3 
While many Recovery Act
projects are focused more
immediately on jump
starting the economy,
others, especially those
involving infrastructure
improvements, are expected
to contribute to economic
growth for many years by
creating a multitude of
employment opportunities.
Twenty-eight different
agencies—such as the
Departments of Education;
Health and Human Services;
and Energy—have been
allocated a portion of the
$787 billion in Recovery
funds. Each agency
developed specific plans for
how it would spend its
Recovery Act funds. The
agencies then awarded
grants and contracts to
state governments or, in
some cases, directly to
schools, hospitals,
contractors, or other
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organizations. The agencies
are required to file weekly
financial reports on how
they are spending the
money and their specific
activities related to Recovery
funds. 
Due to the pressing
nature of the economy,
Congress intended to award
stimulus infrastructure
funds to projects that could
be authorized in a short
timeframe (120 days of
appropriation). In
recognition of the urgency to
select and execute projects
expeditiously, selection of
proposed projects was based
upon the overriding
objective of job creation.
Congress established
unified priorities and
formulated guidance to lead
the project selection
process. The guidance
prescribed the following
framework to assess a
project’s suitability for
Recovery Act funding:
• Expediency of
implementation; 
• Address high priority
needs; 
• Job creation potential;
and
• Long-term value.
Each applicant requesting
an allotment of Recovery Act
funds was done internally
within the specific agency.
Each applicant was
responsible for the creation
of the proposed pipeline
based upon Recovery Act
criteria, and the allotment of
Recovery Act funds was
merit based upon
infrastructure projects
submitted by each
applicant. 
Governmental Tort
Immunity
This article will address
tort negligence as it relates
to infrastructure projects
funded via the Recovery Act.
A tort (meaning “wrong”
from the Latin term tortum)
is a wrong that involves a
breach of a civil duty owed
to another party.4 A tort is
differentiated from criminal
wrongdoing, which involves
a breach of a duty owed to
society. A person who
suffers legal injury may be
able to use tort law to
receive damages (usually
monetary compensation)
from the party responsible
or liable for those injuries.
Federal and State
jurisdictions generally
define what is a deemed tort
activity for which parties
may seek redress for
damages. In the United
States, tort law generally
falls into one of three
categories: intentional torts,
negligence, and strict
liability torts. 
The most common tort
action in the United States
is negligence. Negligence is
generally defined by four
elements: duty, breach of
duty, causation and
damages. That is, but for
the negligent party’s act or
omission, the damages to
the other party (the plaintiff)
would not have been
incurred, and the damages
were a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of
the tortuous conduct.5 
Certain individuals and
entities are granted
immunity from both damage
awards and assessments of
liability in tort. Immunity is
a defense to a legal action in
which public policy
demands special protection
for an entity or a class of
persons participating in a
particular field or activity.6
Historically, immunity from
tort litigation has been
granted to government
units, public officials,
charities, educational
institutions, spouses,
parents, and children. 
Government immunity,
also known as sovereign
immunity, insulates federal,
state, and local governments
from liability for torts that
an employee commits within
the scope of his or her
official duties.7 Public
policy, as reflected by
legislation, common-law
precedent, and popular
opinion, has required courts
to protect the government
from unnecessary
disruptions that invariably
result from civil litigation.
Similarly, educational
institutions generally have
been immunized from tort
actions to protect students
and faculty from distraction.
Over the last quarter
century, nearly every
jurisdiction has curtailed
tort immunity in some
fashion. The movement to
restrict tort immunity has
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been based, in part, upon
the rule of law which
requires all persons,
organizations, and
government officials to be
treated equally under the
law.8 Despite the efforts of
this movement, tort
immunity persists in
various forms at the federal,
state, and local levels. 
Throughout the history of
the United States, the
federal government has
invoked sovereign immunity
and declared the federal
government may not be
sued unless it has waived
its immunity or consented
to suit. In Gibbons v. United
States,9 the United States
Supreme Court (the
“Supreme Court”) held that
the federal government
could not be sued without
the consent of Congress.
Congress has waived
sovereign immunity to a
limited extent via specific
Congressional acts such as
the Federal Torts Claims Act
(FTCA) and Tucker Act.10
The FTCA provides a limited
waiver of the federal
government’s sovereign
immunity, the common law
doctrine that a government
cannot be sued in its own
courts without its consent.
By enacting the FTCA,
Congress waived sovereign
immunity for certain tort
suits.11 The Tucker Act
waives immunity over
claims arising out of
contracts to which the
federal government is a
party. 
The Supreme Court, in
Hans v. Louisiana,12 held
that the Eleventh
Amendment of the United
States Constitution affirmed
states possess sovereign
immunity and are,
therefore, immune from
being sued in federal court
without their consent
because states entered the
federal system with their
sovereignty intact. Article III
of the United States
Constitution is limited by
this sovereignty and a state,
therefore, may not be
subject to suit in federal
court unless it has
consented to such.13 
Most states either
expressly created via their
respective state
constitution, or via judicial
decree, that the state was
immune from suit. In some
circumstances, states waive
in whole or part their
immunity. Over time, many
states have narrowed the
immunity through statutes
and judicial decisions. 
If the federal and state
governments have a form of
immunity that shields each
from suit and liability, can
that governmental immunity
be legally imputed to a
contractor or subcontractor
working under the
supervision of government
agents? If yes, the small
umbrella of tort liability
protection for government
agents may be enlarged to
protect hundreds of
independent contractors
from a storm of potential
tort claims. The Supreme
Court addressed this issue
in Boyle v. United
Technologies.14
In Boyle, the Supreme
Court reversed a lower court
jury award in favor of the
family of David Boyle.15 Mr.
Boyle was a United States
Marine killed when the
helicopter he was co-piloting
crashed off the coast of
Virginia during a training
exercise. While Mr. Boyle
survived the crash, he was
unable to escape the
helicopter and drowned.
Unlike the helicopter pilot’s
door that opened inward,
the co-pilot door of the
helicopter was designed to
open outward with the
access hatch handle being
obstructed by other
equipment. As such, Mr.
Boyle was unable to push
the door open under water
and unable to escape the
helicopter. The legal issue
before the Supreme Court
was whether Sikorsky
Helicopters, a military
defense contractor who
manufactured the helicopter
via military contract, could
be held liable under state
tort law involving an injury
resulting from a defective
door/hatch design. 
First, the “Petitioner’s
broadest contention was
that in the absence of
legislation specifically
immunizing government
contractors from liability for
design defects, there is no
basis for judicial recognition
of such a defense.”16 The
Supreme Court disagreed
and held that 
In most fields of
activity, to be sure, [the]
Court has refused to
find federal pre-emption
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of State law in the
absence of either a
clear statutory
prescription or a direct
conflict between federal
and State law. But we
have held that a few
areas, involving
“uniquely federal
interests,” are so
committed by the
Constitution and laws
of the United States to
federal control that
State law is pre-empted
and replaced, where
necessary, by federal
law of a content
prescribed (absent
explicit statutory
directive) by the courts-
so-called “federal
common law.”17
The Supreme Court
further examined the
dispute in Boyle to be the
crux between two areas that
involve “uniquely federal
interests” that generally
require the obligations and
rights of the United States
and its agencies within a
contractual setting to be
governed solely and
exclusively by federal law;
however, in the Boyle case,
the United States was not
under scrutiny for its
contractual responsibilities.
The Supreme Court, here,
was determining the liability
of the United States to third
persons if
that liability may be
styled one in tort, but it
arises out of
performance of the
contract—and
traditionally has been
regarded as sufficiently
related to the contract
that until 1962 Virginia
would generally allow
design defect suits only
by the purchaser and
those in privity with the
seller.18
Conversely, another area
of particular concern
addressed in Boyle
warranting the displacement
of state law is “the civil
liability of federal officials
for actions taken in the
course of their duty.”19 In
the Boyle case, an
independent contractor
performed its duties under a
“procurement contract,
rather than an official
performing his duty as a
federal employee, but there
is implicated the same
interest in getting the
government’s work done.”20
Throughout the course of
history, the Government’s
interest in the procurement
of equipment has tangently
been included even though
the litigation was only
between private parties. And
it is well established law
that “litigation … purely
between private parties and
does not touch the rights
and duties of the United
States” is governed by state
law; rather than federal
law;21 however, when the
interests of the United
States will be directly
affected, federal law does
displace the controlling
authority of state or local
law. The procurement of
equipment by the United
States is an area specifically
unique to the United States
government that establishes
a necessary condition for
displacement though not an
over-reaching concept for
the displacement of all local
and state laws.
As a general rule,
displacement of state laws
or regulations by federal
regulators or law will occur
only where a “significant
conflict”22 exists between an
identifiable “federal policy or
interest and the operation of
state law” or the application
of state law would frustrate
specific objectives of federal
legislation. The Supreme
Court reasoned the FTCA is
a statutory provision that
suggests the outline for
“significant conflict”
between federal interests
and state law in the context
of United States government
procurement. The FTCA
includes an exception to the
consent to sue the
government or its employees
when a claim is based upon
the exercise or failure to
exercise or perform a
discretionary function or
duty. The selection of the
appropriate design for
military equipment to be
used by the Armed Forces is
assuredly a discretionary
function. Therefore, in
processing government
projects, such as designing
a military helicopter, the
federal government has a
duty to protect those within
the scope of danger or risk.
Merely passing that project
to an independent
contractor to manufacture
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the product does not allow
the federal government to
escape liability; it may,
however, expand that
government immunity to the
independent government
contractor. 
Thus, the authors’
proposition is that the
imposition of liability on
government contractors will
directly affect the terms of
government contracts with
either the contractor
declining to manufacture
the design or being forced to
raise the price. Regardless
of the result upon
contractors, the interests of
the United States will be
directly affected, in that a
state law that holds
government contractors
liable for design defects in
military equipment presents
in some circumstances, a
“significant conflict” with
federal policy and must be
displaced. 
Clearly established by the
Supreme Court decision in
Boyle, liability for design
defects in military
equipment cannot be
imposed pursuant to state
law, when 1) the United
States approved reasonable
precise specifications; 2) the
equipment conformed to
those specifications; and 3)
the supplier warned the
United States about the
dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known
to the supplier but not to
the United States. The third
condition is necessary
because in its absence the
displacement of state law
would create some incentive
for the manufacturer to
withhold knowledge of
risks.23 The plaintiffs in
Boyle argued that, in the
absence of legislation
specifically immunizing the
government contractors
from liability for design
defects, there is no basis for
judicial recognition of such
a defense. The defendants
(Sikorsky and United
Technologies) successfully
argued government
contractors are shielded
(imputed sovereign
immunity) from state tort
liability as an employee of
the United States
government exercising
discretionary functions.
Imputed Federal Tort
Immunity – Boyle v.
United Technologies
Due to the inherent
nature of how the federal
government approved
project submissions as well
as each states’ submission
for project approval, have
contractors/subcontractors
been afforded a form of
imputed sovereign immunity
for Recovery Act infrastruc-
ture projects?
Though federal law may
not broadly displace state
and local laws dealing with
governmental liability to
third parties prior to the
Recovery Act, it may have
inadvertently done so with
this profound legislation. As
previously discussed,
Congress has legislated
“significant conflicts”
between federal interests
and state law in the context
of Government procurement
by and though the FTCA.
Under the FTCA,
Congress authorized
damages to be
recovered against the
United States for harm
caused by the negligent
or wrongful conduct of
Government employees,
to the extent that a
private person would be
liable under the law of
the place where the
conduct occurred. It
exempted from this
consent to suit,
however, “[a]ny claim ...
based upon the exercise
or performance or the
failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary
function or duty on the
part of a federal agency
or an employee of the
Government, whether
or not the discretion
involved be abused.”24
Ironically, projects
authorized for Recovery Act
funds go through an
extensive approval and
bidding process which have
been stripped of any
discretion from the
contractor. Linking the
minimal discretion in
government procurement
contracts in which, for
example,
the selection of the
appropriate design for
military equipment to
be used by our Armed
Forces is assuredly a
discretionary function
within the meaning of
[the above provision],
often involves not
merely engineering
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analysis but judgment
as to the balancing of
many technical,
military and even social
considerations,
including specifically
the tradeoff between
greater safety and
greater combat
effectiveness.25 
Infrastructure projects
allocated funding under the
Recovery Act require
particular guidelines and
specifications for the safety
of the general public, as well
as traffic management,
security concerns and
various other purposes. As
the US Supreme Court
stated in Boyle, 
It makes little sense to
insulate the govern-
ment against financial
liability for the
judgment that a
particular feature of
military equipment is
necessary when the
government produces
the equipment itself,
but not when it
contracts for the
production. In sum,
[the court found] that
state law which holds
government contractors
liable for design defects
in military equipment
present a ‘significant
conflict’ with federal
policy and must be
displaced.26
Would infrastructure
projects governed to a
higher level of specificity not
warrant a similar, if not
heightened, extension of
immunity than that of mere
equipment?
Analogous to the funds
presented under the
Recovery Act for
infrastructure projects, in
1992, Congress enacted the
Federally Supported Health
Centers Assistance Act 
to provide FTCA
medical malpractice
coverage to the Health
Center Program for a 3-
year period. This
coverage was made
permanent by the
Federally Supported
Health Centers
Assistance Act of
1995.27 FTCA coverage
only applies to Health
Centers that receive
funding under Section
330 of the Public Health
Service Act and to the
employees, board
members, and
contractors who are
deemed “employees” of
the Public Health
Service under the
Federally Supported
Health Centers
Assistance Act. The
Health Center Program
includes community
health centers, health
centers for homeless
and migrant popula-
tions, and health
centers in public
housing complexes.
Similar to government
employees (i.e., military,
agency workers, etc.), those
employees under the Health
Center Program are
excluded from liability for
medical malpractice under
the FTCA. Interestingly
enough more than 1,100
Health Centers have
coverage under the FTCA,
but this federal protection
against liability does not
extend to health care
providers considered
volunteers at approximately
78 of the Health Centers
using volunteers.28 Though
volunteers engage in
substantially similar
activities as those protected
under the FTCA, they are at
risk for medical malpractice
because they do not fall
under the umbrella of
protection provided by the
FTCA explicitly.
The federal government is
very aware of this situation
and has made two efforts to
protect volunteer health
care providers. In 1996, the
Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act was
enacted to extend FTCA
medical malpractice
coverage to volunteers at
free clinics. The second
enactment was the
Volunteer Protection Act, in
which some general
protection may be afforded
to volunteers who assist
government entities and
non-profit organizations
from ordinary negligence
occurring during the course
of their volunteer work, with
some exceptions.29 In many
ways, independent
contractors working for the
federal government are very
similar to these volunteers
being afforded extended
protection by the federal
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government. For example,
independent contractors
work for and under the
guidance of government
employees, which is very
similar to the volunteers at
Health Centers. Conversely
though, independent
contractors have little
discretion in how their work
is carried out, due to the
extreme approval process in
project selection. Assuming
arguendo, volunteers are
probably allowed some
discretion in how they
proceed in treating a
patient. The supervening
causes of negligence do not
seem to outweigh the
benefit of the FTCA coverage
for volunteers. Therefore,
the argument for extended
coverage to those
independent contractors
completing projects under
the direct supervision and
approval of the government
(i.e., infrastructure projects
under the Recovery Act) is
stronger for extended
protection of the FTCA since
they are merely the hand of
the extended arm of
government work.
North Carolina Tort
Claims Act
Long standing North
Carolina common law
established that “the
doctrine of sovereign
immunity protected the
state from any liability for
negligence or tortuous
conduct on the part of the
state or its agents—this
immunity, or freedom from
suit, reflected the ancient
notion that the King could
do no wrong.”30 North
Carolina continues to
protect state actors from
liability except where waived
explicitly by statute. In
1951, the North Carolina
Generally Assembly (the
“General Assembly”) waived
a portion of the State’s
immunity by enacting the
North Carolina Tort Claims
Act (the “NCTCA”), which
allows tort claims to be
brought against State
agencies under in certain
situations.31 
Under the NCTCA, the
General Assembly directed
all tort claims against the
State arising under this act
to the North Carolina
Industrial Commission (the
“Commission”) for review.32
Once the Commission
receives the case, it must
“determine whether the
claim arose as a result of
the negligence of any officer,
employee, involuntary
servant or agent of the State
while acting within the
scope of his office,
employment, service, agency
or authority, under
circumstances where the
State of North Carolina, if a
private person would be
liable to the claimant in
accordance with the laws of
North Carolina.”33 If the
Commission finds that a
State officer, employee or
agent while acting within
the scope of his office,
employment, or agency was
the proximate cause of the
claimant’s injuries it may
award damages, so long as
there was no contributory
negligence on behalf of the
claimant.34 Though the
State may be held liable for
any negligent acts
committed, just as a private
party may be liable, the
NCTCA may protect the
actor from personal liability. 
Conversely, an employer
in North Carolina is
generally not liable for the
torts of an independent
contractor because the
doctrine of respondeat
superior imposes liability
only for conduct of
employees;35 however, if the
employer has the right to
control the manner and
method of the work being
done, the worker will be
considered an employee or
agent and not an
independent contractor.36
Under North Carolina law,
state agencies may be liable
for the torts of independent
contractors. First, state
agencies may be liable for
the actions of independent
contractors performing non-
delegable duties37 or
engaging in inherently
dangerous activities.38
Additionally, contractors
may be considered agents of
the state under the NCTCA,
and liability may be
premised on the negligence
of the employer choosing
the contractor to do the
work.39 In sum, under the
NCTCA, a claimant may
proceed with a negligence
claim against the state
agency with the Commission
rather than an individual
actor so long as the
negligent behavior qualifies
under the immunity
exceptions.
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In North Carolina, for
infrastructure projects,
such as road construction, 
extensive long-term
planning goes into the
building of each North
Carolina highway. As
the first major step in
the process, the North
Carolina Department of
Transportation
(“NCDOT”) Planning
Branch assists
Metropolitan Planning
Organizations, small
urban areas and
counties across North
Carolina in the
development of
comprehensive
transportation plans,
which outline
transportation priorities
for the next 20-25 years
based upon future land
use, employment and
population changes in
an area.40
Before any road
construction can begin,
the Project
Development and
Environmental Analysis
Branch, or PDEA, is
responsible for the
development and
preparation of planning
and environmental
documents for all
highway projects
(according to state and
federal guidelines,
PDEA staff evaluates all
proposed North
Carolina highway
projects). The process
includes specialized
environmental studies
and coordination with
the environmental
regulatory agencies to
ensure appropriate
consideration is given to
environmental matters.
Specialists in such
fields as noise and air
quality, archaeology,
architectural history,
biology, land-use
planning and sociology
provide evaluations
regarding the
environmental impacts
of proposed highway
projects. The process
also involves design and
traffic engineering
studies, which provide
an analysis of highway
alternatives to safely,
efficiently and
economically meet
future travel
demands.41
The next step is for
“design engineers to prepare
detailed plans for the
highway within the selected
location. These plans define
the type of highway cross-
section (two-lane or multi-
lane), the width of right-of-
way required, and the type
of intersections and
interchanges, as well as
bridges, culverts and other
drainage features.”42 Each of
the plans must “identify the
type of materials to be used
and estimate the quantity of
each material required to
construct the highway.
These technical plans allow
preparation of contract
documents and
advertisements for
contractors wishing to place
bids. Contractors must meet
criteria specified by NCDOT
to be eligible to bid.43
When North Carolina is
ready to bring life to the
plans, “bids are received for
construction on the
identified date and are
publicly disclosed. NCDOT
awards the contract to the
lowest responsible bidder.
The bidder (private
contractor) is then obligated
to construct the project in
accordance with plan
requirements and
specifications upon which
the bid was received.44
Continuously, the 
NCDOT staff in the
Division of Highways
administers the
contract and provides
inspection and testing
functions to assure the
project is properly
constructed. A NCDOT
resident engineer and
his/her staff interpret
plan details and
contract requirements,
test for quality, check
for conformity with
contractual
requirements and
document the quantity
of work performed so
the contractor can be
paid on a monthly
basis. The resident
engineer and staff also
make certain the
environment is
protected, manage
traffic flow along the
project, work with
adjacent property
owners, observe work
zone safety and oversee
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coordination with state
and federal agencies.45
The last step before a road
is open for travel is “a final
inspection made by an
engineer not involved in the
project’s construction to
verify it has been completed
properly.”46 
As the process outlined
above demonstrates, various
state agencies provide
direction, supervision,
pointed guidance, and
oversight of the independent
contractors for road and
infrastructure projects.
Little discretion is allowed
by the contract to deviate
from the state’s plans. Given
the current standing of
North Carolina tort law,
independent contractors
working pursuant to the
process outlined by NCDOT
would not be considered an
“independent contractor” for
the purposes of tort liability.
Rather under respondeat
superior, the state agencies
should be found liable for
any negligent actions
committed rather than the
independent contractors
privately. These
independent contractors are
mere agents of state
agencies; thereby protected
as a group from tort liability
for potential design and
construction defects in
projects.
Conclusion
The traditional format of
federal road and
infrastructure contribution
funds grant each state
discretion for disbursement
of funds to projects; how-
ever, under the stipulations
of the Recovery Act, federal
funds were provided and
restricted to projects which
the federal government
reviewed and approved.
Funds flow from federal
coffers to the respective
state for earmarked projects
with zero discretion given to
the state for disbursement.
In addition, contractors lack
the ability to modify or vary
project parameters set by
federal and state agencies.
Therefore, the federal
government’s haste to jump
start the economy and place
Recovery Act funds into
service as quickly as
possible coupled with the
state’s rush for project
approval, contractors and
subcontractors may have
the unintended effect of
governmental tort immunity
imputed to them.
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